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Fear of destruction of state sovereignty 30 is the principal motivation in
reaching this decision. According to Justice Gunnar, this catastrophe can
result if Congress transgresses beyond the confines specifically delegated
to it by.the Constitution.A But his reasoning is faulty when he declares:
If, as interstate commerce Congress can prohibit a state tax on net income derived from interstate commerce, then, Congress can prohibit all state taxation
under its broad power to regulate intrastate affairs affecting interstate commerce32

Justice Gunnar fails to realize that it is not the purpose of Congress in
passing P.L. 86-272 to deprive the states of any revenue. It is designed to
protect foreign corporations from inequities that have resulted from the
variety of tax systems devised in the many states. This certainly does not
indicate that Congress has as its objective further legislation that will
completely destroy the states' power to tax.
It remains to be seen what direction this interesting controversy will
take. With two such sharply conflicting opinions there is a compelling
need for resolution and clarification in a higher forum. In addition Congress in its study of the problem, which is still in process, may decide to
amend or completely replace P.L. 86-272 thus rendering the ultimate
question moot. However, because of the courts' hesitance to interfere with
the acknowledged plenary power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, it is likely that this statute will remain in force unaltered.
Dennis Carlin
30 Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. State Tax Commission, 5 State Tax Cases
250-116 (Ore. Tax 1964), the Oregon Tax Court writes "Stripped of the power to
tax, the Sovereignty of states is a hollow shell."
31 Mr. Justice Gunnar also makes mention of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's words in
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946), where he points out interstate commerce
should be regulated but not at the expense of state sovereignity.
. 82 Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. State Tax Commission, 5 State Tax Cas.
250-116 (Ore. Tax 1964).

JURISDICTION-TORTS-APPLICATION OF "SINGLE ACT"
STATUTE BY FORUM STATE WHEN ACTUAL
DAMAGE OCCURRED IN SISTER STATE
Estwing Manufacturing Company, an Illinois corporation, manufactured
hammers marked unbreakable and shipped them, f.o.b. Rockford, Illinois,
to the defendant, Walker's Minerals, for subsequent resale. The dealer's
purchases were made by mail order using Estwing's catalogue. Plaintiff's
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aunt purchased one such hammer from Walker's in New York and presented it to plaintiff, a ten year old. Plaintiff was in Connecticut on a field
trip when the hammer broke, resulting eventually in the loss of his eye.
Suit was commenced in New York pursuant to a New York statute' providing for in personam jurisdiction of foreign corporations committing
a tortious act within the state. Plaintiff sought damages for his injury alleging breach of warranty 2 and negligence. Defendant moved to vacate
service of summons and complaint. The tr'ial court granted the motion
which was reversed by the Supreme Court, Appellate Division. Singer v.
Walker, 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S. 2d 216 (1964).

The case was decided in accordance with the New York "single act"
statute conferring jurisdiction over a foreign corporation where a tort is
committed within the forum state. The issue resolves itself into a question of whether the resulting damage came within the meaning of the
"tortious act" section of the statute. The underlying issue, however, is
how far the "last event" doctrine may be extended-in other words, how
important is the fact that the damage occurred in Connecticut rather
than in New York where the action was brought? One further facet
which merits discussion is the dangerous propensity of the hammer and
to what extent it influenced the court's decision.
When the question of whether a court can exercise jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant arises, the constitutional question of due process is often
involved. Under the holding in Pennoyer v. Neff,3 physical control over
the person of the defendant is necessary tc satisfy due process. In order
to liberalize this rule, the courts have resorted to the fictional theories of
"consent,' 4 "presence," 5 and "doing business." 6 The Court, in International
1N.Y. CIv. PRAC. R. § 302 (a) (2) (1963) which states: "A court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, as to a cause
of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, in the same
manner as if he were a domiciliary of the state, if, in person or through an agent, he:
...2. commits a tortious act within the state ..."
2It is interesting to note that although plaintiff: brought the action alleging both
negligence and breach of warranty, the court decided the issue of negligence but failed
to render an opinion as to whether the New York court had jurisdiction on the breach
of warranty. This is due to the fact that the New York "single act" statute makes no
mention of breach of warranty but requires only that defendant either commit a tortious act in the state or that he transact business in the state. Since the court found that
it had jurisdiction under the tortious act section, whether or not a breach of warranty
had, in fact, been committed would have been purely academic and would have no
additional import in conferring jurisdiction.
395 U.S. 714, 731 (1877).
4 The consent thesis rests on the proposition that, since a foreign corporation could
not carry on business within a state without the permission of that state, the state
could impose as a condition of engaging in busine:;s within its borders a requirement
that the corporation appoint an agent to receive service of process within the state.
See Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc. v. Superior Court of Wash-
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Shoe Co. v. Washington7 attempted to do away with the existing confusion by holding that in order to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a defendant, it is necessary that the defendant have certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state. By virtue of the authority of their decisions,
many states were quick to pass statutes generally enumerating the "minimum contacts" doctrine. These are referred to as the "single act" statutes.
Many of the recent decisions concerning a tortious act by a foreign defendant are based on interpretations of these so called "single act" statutes,
which have placed within the hands of the courts a means whereby they
can vastly extend their jurisdiction over foreign corporations. These statutes do not require proof of continuous activity-a single tortious act is
sufficient. Some of these jurisdictions have a clause stating that a foreign
corporation is subect to tjhe court's jurisdiction on a cause of action arising out of tortious conduct in this state, "whether arising out of repeated
activity or single acts." Other jurisdictions require "the commission of a
tortious act within this state,"9 and still others declare that "if such foreign
ington, 289 U.S. 361 (1933); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining and Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
5 The presence theory, unlike the consent doctrine, sustains jurisdiction against
corporations on claims which do not arise out of business done within that state. See
People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917); Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v.
McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917), where the court said, "A foreign corporation is
amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in the absence of consent, only if it
is doing business within the state in such manner and to such extent as to warrant the
inference that it is present there." See generally McBaine, Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Corporations:Actions Arising Out of Acts Done Within, the Forum, 1946 CALIF. L.
REV. 331 (1946).
GThe term "doing business" is often used to describe the legal conclusion that the
corporate activities within a state are sufficient to subject the corporation to the jurisdiction of that state. Not all acts of a corporation amount to "doing business" in the
legal sense, however, and in the policy matter of balancing the conflicting interests, the
courts have developed various meanings for "doing business." An example can be found
in Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry., where a corporation whose agents
within a state did no business other than solicit orders was not "doing business" in the
state. 205 U.S. 530 (1907). See International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579
(1914); see also Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (C.A.2, 1930) where Judge
Learned Hand stated that it was necessary to develop a reasonable test based on "some
continuous dealings in the state of the forum; enough to demand trial away from its
home."
7326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8 CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. § 33-411 (1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (1960).
9

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-514 (Supp. 1963); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 § 17 (1963); ME.
REV. STAT. ch. 112 § 21 (Supp. 1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13 (Supp. 1963); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3-16 (Supp. 1963); N.Y. CiV. PRAC. R. §302; WAsH. REV. STAT. ANN.
§4.28.185 (1962); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 3080 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. §262.05 (Supp.

1963).
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corporation commits a tort in whole or in. part, in [the state], against a
resident of [the state], such act shall be deemed to be doing business in [the
state] ."1

There is general agreement that when a tort is committed wholly within the forum state, the requirements of due process are met." The fact that
the witnesses to the incident usually reside in the state and that the corporation enters the state voluntarily for financial gains explains this conform12
ity of opinion.
There is, however, a good deal more variation in decisions where the
tort is committed partially within the state, such as a case in which a manufacturer, not licensed to do business withi.n the forum, delivers a faulty
4
product and a resident is thereby injured. The Minnesota 3 and Illinois'
Supreme Courts have supported the "last event" doctrine by agreeing that
"the place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make
an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place"'1 and, therefore, the wrong
was committed at least in part within the state where the injury occurred.
However, a number of decisions have denied jurisdiction where the conduct occurred entirely outside the forum :;tate even though the damage
occurred within the court's jurisdiction. 16
The facts in Anderson v. Penncraft Too'l Co. 7 are similar to those in
10 IOWA

CODE ANN. S 617.3 (Supp. 1963); TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3021b (Supp.
1960); VT. REv. STAT. tit. 12 S 855 (1959).
11 Hutchinson v. Boyd & Sons Press Sales, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 876 (D. Minn. 1960);
John v. Bay State Abrasive Prod. Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950).
12 See generally Note, 50 MICH. L. REv. 763 (1952).
3
1 Ehlers v. U.S. Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 124 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1963);
Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960).
14 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 NI.E.2d 673 (1957).
15 RESTATEMENT, CONFICT OF LAWS, § 377 (1958). But see Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc.,
172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959), where the court reached an opposite decision. The
non-resident manufacturer sold a chair to a retailer in Minnesota who in turn sold
it to the plaintiff. The faulty construction caused plaintiff's injury. The court held
that the tort occurred where the chair was manufactured and, therefore, plaintiff
couldn't obtain an in personam judgment. 172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959).
16 Muraco v. Ferentino, 42 Misc. 2d 104, 247 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1964); Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959); Hardy v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.,
19 Ill. App. 2d 75, 153 N.E.2d 269 (1958); Rensing v. Turner Aviation Corp., 166 F.
Supp. 790 (N.D. I11.1958); Putnam v. Triangle Pablications, 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d
445 (1957); Hellriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. I11.1957);
Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Prod. Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950).
17 200 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. IlL. 1961). Accord, McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co.,
199 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ill. 1961); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Hutchinson v. Boyd & Sons Press Sales,

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

the instant case. Plaintiff was injured by an instrumentality manufactured
and sold outside the forum state by a company whose only contact with
Illinois was the presence of the product at the occurrence of the accident.
There, as here, defendant did no business in Illinois and had no agent
physically present within the state. It was held that the state court had
jurisdiction because the injury came within the meaning of the statute
providing for jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries committing a tortious act
within the state.' 8 The Illinois statute referred to is very similar to the New
York statute in the instant case. 19
A dissimilarity between Singer v. Walker and the Anderson case is the
place where the injury occurred. In the Anderson case the damage occurred in the state where the action was brought, while in the instant case
plaintiff purchased the hammer in the forum state but suffered injury in
another state. The court disposes of this seemingly significant problem by
declaring it to be unimportant. 20 The court has, by this decision, extended
the meaning of the "last event" doctrine. Previous cases have involved
only two states, one being the state of manufacture and the second the
state where the article was purchased, where the damage occurred and
where the suit was filed. In the instant case, however, three states were
involved. The article was manufactured in Illinois, sold and the action
brought in New York, and the damage occurred in Connecticut. Hence for
the first time a tortious act was found to have been committed in the state
where plaintiff purchased the article, in spite of the fact that the actual
damage to plaintiff occurred in a third state.
The court goes one step further in stating that, "of paramount importance, no doubt, is the fact that an instrument dangerous to human life and
health, if defective, is involved."'21 As dictum the court implied that if this
case had not involved a dangerous instrument there would be no liability
188 F. Supp. 876 (D. Minn. 1960); Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn.
571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960). Smvth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569,
80 A.2d 664, 25 A.L.R.2d 1193 (1915); See generally Note, 9 DE PAUL L. REV. 106 (1959).
Contra, Mann v. Equitable Co., 209 F. Supp. 571 (N.D.W.Va. 1962); Moss v. City
of Winston-Salem, 254 N.C. 480, 119 S.E.2d 445 (1961); Pendzimas v. Eastern Metal
Products Corp., 218 F. Supp. 524 (D. Minn. 1961).
18
ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 110 § 17 (1) (b) (1963).
19 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. § 302(a)2.
20"... the place or places to which the infant plaintiff took the hammer in his use
of it is of less relevance. Thus, it happened that it was in Connecticut that the defective hammer broke under the strain to which it was subjected and caused the harm. It
could just as well have been in New York or in any other place that this would have
happened." 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 290, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216, 221 (1964).
21 Singer v. Walker, 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 292, 250 N.Y.S. 2d 216, 221 (1964).
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under the "single act" statute in spite of the fact that a tort had been
committed.
An era of rapid technological achievements has enabled corporations to
extend the scope of their activities. It has also become increasingly less
22
burdensome to defend actions in jurisdictions foreign to the corporation.
The Supreme Court has applied a flexible standard of reasonableness and
fair play to the requirements of due process, providing both latitude and
limitation to the exercise of state court jurisdiction over foreign corporations. 23 The outermost limits of jurisdicticn on the commission of a tor-

tious act have not been clearly defined, but it is apparent that the application of "single act" statutes to impose jurisliction over a foreign corporation on the basis of a single tort without prior business in the state satisfies
due process.

24

The holding in the present case is an attempt by the New York court to
extend its jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. While previous cases
have upheld jurisdiction when the damage: occurs in the state where the
action is brought, in this case jurisdiction was allowed in spite of the fact
that the damage occurred in another state. It remains to be seen whether
or not other courts will uphold the decision that "the occurrence of the
harm in Connecticut was incidental for jurisdictional purposes. ' 25
Harold Stotland
22 The doctrine of relative inconveniences has been applied in cases involving in
personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations. See Chovan v. E. I. Dupont De
Nemours &Co., 217 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Mich. 1963); Dahlberg Co.v. American Sound
Products, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 928 (D. Minn. 1959); Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Prod. Co.,
89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950).
23326 U.S. 310 (1945).
24 McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co., 199 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. 111. 1961); Hutchinson
v.Boyd & Sons Press Sales, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 876 (D. Minn. 1960).
2521 App. Div. 2d 285, 286, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216, 2).8 (1964).

PATENTS-ORIGINALITY OF INVENTION-SUGGESTIONS
TO INVENTORS
Polye, the junior party in an interference proceeding had isolated the
cause of failure in a certain type of electric switch. Uhl, the senior party
in interference, had discussed the problem with Polye and suggested the
incorporation of a certain chemical compound into the switch to obviate
the difficulty. Polye experimented with the idea of Uhl, reduced to practice the improved version, and filed a patent application. The Court of

